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COMMENTS
A PHENOMENOLOGY OF JUSTICE AND THE CASE
FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
INTRODUCTION
The exposition of an idea entails the placing of the idea within a hori-
zon of meaning. While the nature of the exposition may require little,
if any, specific location, more often a writer will find it necessary to ex-
plicitly present the foundational horizon in order to minimize misunder-
standing. This is particularly true of philosophical ideas, and, conse-
quently, the first problem encountered by this Comment. Because the
problem of civil disobedience will ultimately be treated in relation to the
jury's power of nullification1 and because such a treatment, while practical
in application, makes little sense apart from the ethical and historical con-
siderations, there must be an initial concern for the ideas of justice and
law themselves. In the presentation of these ideas the following introduc-
tory remarks should serve as a guide.
A. Phenomenology2
The domain of phenomenology can encompass every aspect of human
reasoning and speculation. Edmund Husserl, who is considered the
founder of the phenomenological movement, wrote the following for the
1927 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica:
1. When considering the remarks of the final pages of this Comment concerning
the rights and powers of the jury in criminal cases it should be noted that the right
to trial by jury contained in the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States has only been applicable to the states since the last decade, Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Since its incorporation, however, the right to jury trial
has been diluted by the Supreme Court's decisions sanctioning the use of less than
twelve person juries, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and allowing the jury
to convict with non~unanimous verdicts, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
2. It is impossible to give a definition of phenomenology without misleading
those who will receive it, for it is not so much a type, much less a branch, of philo-
sophy as it is a movement which encompasses and characterizes a certain perspective
towards philosophical inquiry. Husserl himself encountered difficulties in presenting
his concept of phenomenology to the extent that he found it necessary to introduce
its basic concepts in several separate and distinct works. See E. HussERL, IDEAS:
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (Gibson transl. 1931); E.
HussEL, CARTESIAN MEnrrATioNs: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (Cairns
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In phenomenology all rational problems have their place, and thus also
those that traditionally are in some special sense or other philosophically
significant .... In short, the metaphysically teleological, the ethical, and
the problems of philosophy of history, no less than, obviously, the problems
of judging reason, lie within its boundary, no differently from all significant
transl. 1960); E. HussERL, THE CRIsIs OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY (Carr
transl. 1970). Husserl's earlier works manifest the intent to avoid history by turning
the focus toward "the things themselves" (zu den Sachen selbst!). Carr, Translator's
Introduction to E. HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES xxx (1970). The
Crisis, however, offers his more mature approach to the problem, one which indicates
a strong respect for the horizonal significance of history and the concept of the "life-
world."
[LIet us recall the fact we have emphasized, namely, that science is a hu-
man spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure,
both historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world
of life, pregiven for all in common. Furthermore, it is an accomplishment
which, in being practiced and carried forward, continues to presuppose this
surrounding world as it is given in its particularity to the scientist.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
Husserl's student, Heidegger abandoned his master's search for a "pure science of
phenomenology," but continued to employ the methodological insights which Hus-
serl's work had developed, applying them to his own "ontology":
With the question of the meaning of Being, our investigation comes up
against the fundamental question of philosophy. This is one that must be
treated phenomenologically. Thus our treatise does not subscribe to a
'standpoint' or represent any special 'direction'; for phenomenology is noth-
ing of either sort, nor can it become so as long as it understands itself. The
expression phenomenology signifies primarily a methodological conception.
This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophi-
cal research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research.
M. HEIDEGGEI, BEING AND TIME 50 (Macquarrie & Robinson transl. 1962) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HEIDEGGER]. For further discussion of Heidegger's view of phenomenol-
ogy see, e.g., id. at 58-63; W. RICHARDSON, HEIDEGGER: THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY
TO THOUGHT 46-47 (1967).
Sartre too makes uses of the phenomenology of Husserl for its methodological in-
sights; however, unlike Heidegger, Sartre's work is also of immediate psychological
significance, showing an influence of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, albeit in existen-
tial terms. See generally J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (Barnes transl. 1956).
Luijpen, whose work provided the impetus for this Comment, views the phenomen-
ological movement as having merged with the existentialist movement begun in the
last century by Soren Kierkegaard. He sees this merger manifest in Heidegger's Be-
Ing and Time, continuing to the present under the name of existential phenomenol-
ogy. W. LuIJPEN, EXiSTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY 34 (rev. ed., Koren transl. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY].
The use of the expression "phenomenology" in this Comment, therefore, is within
the context of a broad movement known as existential phenomenology or phenome-
nological existentialism; it indicates primarily a descriptive methodology illuminating
that which appears. For example, a box appears before a subject, and while it is
immediately known to be a box, it only is so known due to the context within which
the box is situated. For it presents itself only one side at a time, yet the subject
intends the other five sides as well in describing the box as a box. It also appears
on the table, near or far, light or dark within the horizon now present; this horizon
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problems whatever, and all [of them] in their inmost synthetic unity and
order as [being] of transcendental spirit-quality [Geistigkeit, spirituality,
intellectuality]. 3
The idea of justice, therefore, presents itself as a phenomenological prob-
lem of the first order; the idea appears before the consciousness to be
methodologically disclosed as that which "can, even though it shows itself
unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself. .... -4
B. Natural Law5
The basic commitments of legal philosophy can be viewed from one of
-two perspectives: natural law theory or legal positivism.6  The natural
lawyer subscribes to the existence of a metaphysical principle or extralegal
standard which sets the norms of justice and morality; whereas, the legal
positivist rejects the commitment of natural law by either passively equat-
ing morality with de facto legality or explicitly refusing to deal with the
question of morality.7 The presentation of justice which follows implies
an integral relationship between the positive law and the concept of the
moral law, a relationship which is perceived in a normative fashion.
While d "pure theory of law" may be incapable of dealing with the prob,
also includes the factor of time, and thus history. The object is a box, not in itself,
but in its horizon of time and space. While the example is quite simplified, it demon-
strates the fundamental concept of the phenomenological method, the establishment
of objectivity as a mental accomplishment. In the translation of the method to non-
material objects, like justice, law, and truth, the same fundamental concept applies.
For further insight to the relationship of phenomenology to non-material social
concepts or ideas, see generally A. SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
WORLD (Walsh & Lehnert transl. 1967); H. SPIEGELBERG, PHENOMENOLOGY IN PSY-
CHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION (1972).
3. "Phenomenology" Edmund HusserI's Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica
(1927): New Complete Translation by Richard E. Palmer, 2 J. BRIT. Soc'Y PHE-
NOMENOLOGY, May 1971, at 77, 88-89.
4. HEIDEGGER, supra note 2, at 55.
5. For a concise historical introduction to natural law philosophy, see F. ETERO-
VICH, APPROACHES TO NATURAL LAW: FROM PLATO TO KANT (1972).
6. Those associated with natural law history include the following: Plato, Aris-
totle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, Hugo
Grotius, John Locke, Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, John
Courtney Murray, S.J., Heinrich Rommen, and Mr. Justice Douglas. Clearly in-
cluded amongst the positivists are John Austin, Hans Kelsen, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. (see Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAtv. L. REv. 457 (1897)), and H.L.A.
Hart. Nazi Germany has been seen as the ultimate product of a legal system sup-
ported by legal positivistic theory. See, e.g., ExISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra
note 2, 327-33.
7. See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAsv.
L. REV. 593 (1958); contra, Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Pro-
fessor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
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lem of justice, it does not therefore follow that any meaningful treatment
is impossible.8
I. JUSTICE: THE "OUGHT" OF COEXISTENCE
A. Freedom and Its Limits
An analysis of the problem of justice places before the receptive investi-
gator the issue of human freedom, a primordial concept of philosophical
anthropology. Freedom in this context means that each person is funda-
mentally an individual subject, a unique and independent locus through
whom all things and the world itself are manifest. 10 A subject is opposed
to being placed within scientific classifications and denies that human
existence is the mere result of natural processes. Yet, one is neither ab-
solutely free nor alone-there are some obstacles and some patterns of
conduct, some standards for truth and for judgment. Indeed, "meaning
is not left to the subject's arbitrariness. As a 'natural light,' the subject
is the 'letting be' of reality, and as such he is bound to objectivity."'1 The
autonomy of the individual is limited by both the world itself and other
8. Issue must be taken with those of the "pure theory" school of jurisprudence
who subscribe to the following position:
Justice is an irrational ideal. However indispensable it may be for the
willing and acting of human beings it is not viable by reason. Only positive
law is known, or more correctly revealed, to reason.
Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 474, 482 (1934). See also W.
LUIJPEN, PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW 31 et seq. (Koren transl. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW].
9. See EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 2, at 333-34:
Within the framework of a constituted legal order the statement that man
ought to be just means that he ought to obey the rules of law. In this con-
text, then, justice must be described as the willingness to conform to the de-
mands of the legal order. This willingness presupposes man as a subject,
and the "ought" ascribed to justice implies that this willingness is not some-
thing left to the subject's own arbitrary decision, not something to which
he can remain, without prejudice, sensitive or insensitive, but an attitude
which is obligatory. If, then, the subject himself is not obliged, better
even, if being-a-subject itself does not imply a certain obligation, then it re-
mains fundamentally unexplained that the legal order has an obligatory
character. If the subject himself cannot be explicitated as an "obligation,"
one can endlessly repeat that the legal order has an obligatory character,
but this repeated assertion does not really mean anything. A certain
"ought" must be inherent, not to the legal order, but to the subject: he
ought to be just.
10. "Subject" is used here as opposed to "object" or thing. Human beings are
"no things" ("nothingness"). See generally J. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND Hu-
MANISM (Mairet transl. 1948) and J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (Barnes
transl. 1956).
11. EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 2, at 191.
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persons, persons who demand from each other certain responses-re-
sponses which cannot be accounted for by the coerciveness of the positive
law alone.
Nevertheless, people have not and, perhaps, cannot rely upon the will-
ingness of each individual subject to provide the expected responses. It
is naive to think that hatred and violence can be stopped by some eventual
common agreement in and of itself.12  But this does not mean that the
primordial condition of human nature is that described by thinkers like
Thomas Hobbes, a war of all against all.' 3 Rather, it describes a condi-
tion in which the positive law plays an important function in guaranteeing
a community's minimum demands.' 4
B. Justice and Truth
Beyond the ordinary manifestations which are presented to and inter-
preted by the individual subject, there are residues which remain hidden
from full view, yet vaguely present along the foggy edge of each object's
horizonal structure. Ordinarily justice presents itself through the every-
day encounters with one's compliance with already established norms of
conduct; many of these norms are spelled out in the various rules promul-
gated as positive law. On the periphery, however, these norms must
necessarily be grounded in some understanding of the idea of justice itself.
Professor William A. Luijpen presents the concept of justice as an an-
thropological form of coexistence, the struggle against inhumanity, and the
minimum demand of love.' 5 Such an understanding of justice links the
12. See PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 8, at 221: "'mesti-
monies of love' do not suffice to tame 'wolves,' and there is no form of 'communion'
that does not have its moments of weakness. At such moments only positive law
can save a minimum of humanity."
13. See generally T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Collier ed. 1962).
14. See PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 8, at 17-18:
As soon as man manages to reach the level of authentic existence, it becomes
obvious to him that even the most elementary level of authenticity is impos-
sible unless existence is co-existence. To be man is to be a fellow-man.
But even the most simple and most elementary level of co-existence calls
for rules and regulations to make this co-existence possible and to preserve
it when it has been achieved.
15. See id. at 180:
The minimum of the demand of love, the demand which human existence
as co-existence itself is, can thus be formulated as the most fundamental
right of the other. The other's right is the minimum of my 'yes' to his sub-
jectivity, a 'yes' called for by my existence as a 'having to be for the other,'
as an 'ought' on the level of co-existence. And this 'call' is not something
coming from without but is I myself. Thus the other's right is a 'natural
right,' better still, an 'essential right,' for it is implied in the 'nature,' the
'essence,' of co-existence.
1975] 709
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natural law tradition with the existential phenomenological movement and
enables the restatement of this tradition in terms which do not require a
total abandonment of the subject to the purely objectivistic concepts usu-
ally associated with natural law philosophy. Within this phenomenology
of justice, truth is ascertained only by and through the subject who is the
locus of all meaning.
Truth is not, however, a purely subjectivistic opinion which is open to
disputation by anyone seeing it differently. Rather, the proper under-
standing of the ,truth requires comprehension of the meaning of the Greek
word aletheia. Ordinarily rendered by the English "truth," the mean-
ing is much broader in scope. Martin Heidegger has demonstrated
that a more proper translation would be "uncoveredness" or "unconceal-
ment."'16 As "uncoveredness" truth is never merely that which a subject
has opined, but a discovery of Being within a particular context of con-
scious illumination. While truth can only exist for the subject, it cannot
be said that the subject creates the truth. 17
Furthermore, because no one can stand in the place of another and
claim to uncover the other's truth, it might seem that there are as many
,truths as there are individuals. On the contrary, once one has uncovered
the truth and has fully disclosed its significance, no one may rightfully
deny its validity.18  The uncovering of truth "on behalf of all,"' 9 while
accomplished by different subjects, in different places, and at different
16. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 2, at 262-69.
17. See PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 8, at 192:
The 'true' is 'independent' of the subject, for the subject does not create
it and therefore cannot speak arbitrarily of it. However, as independent,
the 'true' cannot be isolated from existence as 'encounter with the independ-
ent' and made an 'in itself,' for the existent subject-as-cogito 'accomplishes'
the independence of the independent, by 'letting it be.' The 'true,' then as
the unconcealed is historical, for it presupposes the historical moment of the
emergence of the subject as 'affirmation of being.'
18. See id. at 202:
In principle, no subject has the right to deny any unconcealedness whatso-
ever, but in practice subjects very frequently contradict one another. How-
ever, no subject can be satisfied with this state of affairs, for in any real
affirmation every subject, as it were, epitomizes all real and possible subjects
who would want to speak of the same unconcealedness and 'on behalf of
all' he makes his affirmation; hence he cannot agree with those who deny
the unconcealedness which he affirms.
19. Id. This concept is not equivalent to Kant's "categorical imperative:" "[a]ct
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should be-
come a universal law." I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 88
(Paton transl. 1964). Kant's statement is one which involves motive, will and antici-
pation, while our point is concerned with the present being of truth.
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times remains an activity which, though distinctly personal, always mani-
fests, from the objective side, a single and unified whole.
Truth is likewise, an historical phenomenon. Its history coincides with
that of Being itself and expands within the realm of knowledge through
a continuing dialogue among the world and its inhabitants. It is due to
its historical character that truth can also be said to be eternal:
[I1n the historical dialogue of the existent subject-as-cogito with
reality the 'already' of unconcealedness is taken up into the 'now.' The
truth of the 'now' does not destroy the truth of the past but makes it more
profound and integrates it. In this sense every truth is immutable.
Every truth is eternal in the sense that whatever in any phase of man's
common history has ever forced the subject to affirm it on the basis of its
unconcealedness will demand the same affirmation in every subsequent
phase of history; hence no subject can ever be justified in denying the same
unconcealedness. 2O
C. The Legal Order
Luijpen states, "The legal order is normative because it participates in,
and is the embodiment of, the minimum of the 'having to be for the
other' which existence as co-existence is.''21 A legal order can only claim
to bind its subjects, therefore, if it partakes in the binding force which the
nature of a common humanity demands. Coexistence requires "being for
the other." The alternative would be Hobbes' war of all against all. Un-
able to accept this alternative Luijpen claims,
no one can say that -the inhumanity of barbarism is the final word with
respect to human relations. At a given moment in the history of a society,
through the intermediary of an 'ethical genius,' there arises a 'vision' of
man's essence which, as a matter of principle, breaks through barbarism or
inhumanity ....
No 'ethical genius' is needed to see that a social contract sometimes de
facto establishes humanity. But a break through inhumanity is secured as a
matter of principle when an 'ethical genius' at a given moment of history
'sees' man's essence as destined for the other, a destiny which brings to
execution by his 'yes' to a 'certain real and practical bond between free-
doms' which belong to the essence of existence as co-existence. 22
As elsewhere, discovery in the legal sphere requires the co-presence of
a subject and the object of discovery. The seeing of an obligation implied
by the nature of human existence as coexistence is an event which be-
20. PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAw, supra note 8, at 201-02.
21. Id. at 181.
22. Id. at 179.
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gins the history of concern for the philosophy of justice and for particular
aspects of positive law as well. This is an event which is occasioned by
the life of an unique person, one who would risk everything else in order
to point to the truth of the demands of justice-an event in the lives of
the best members of a society. 28
What is seen by the best is the basis for any consideration of natural
right, and from the commitment demanded by this perception one finds
certain necessary responses and attitudes which are prerequisites to sus-
tained communal life. However,
it should be obvious that there is no natural law which as an 'in itself,' of
either a real of [sic] an ideal nature, is immutable, eternal and valid. for
all. The objectivity of the natural law must be 'brought about' by an his-
torical act in the co-existence of the 'ethical genius'. This genius, how-
ever, 'brings about' the truth of co-existence on behalf of all those who call
themselves human beings, he 'brings about' a truth that is in principle in-
tersubjective. 24
This intersubjectivitity is, nevertheless, the proper understanding of an ob-
jective positing of the ground of all positive law. In recognizing that the
natural law emanates from the demands of coexistence, one perceives only
the first step toward the establishment of a truly human society. Because
"only a legal order permanently establishes humanity, conceived as the
minimum of man's 'yes' to his fellow-man."'
25
The ever present remnants of hatred and divisiveness require more than
a primordial recognition of that which is just. The human condition de-
mands a formalized and continuing emphasis upon the original recogni-
tion; for the society at large, a putting forth of the minimum requirements
of justice is necessary. This task is performed by the promulgation of
positive law.2 6 Freedom means that no one can be compelled to do more
23. See id. at 196. Luijpen's insistence that the legal order is the result of the
labors and foresight of the best members of a society or, as he puts it, the "ethical
genius," is not without anticipation of the charge of being an elitist. Nevertheless,
[tihe subject for whom the rights and demands of justice are objective
is, at first, the best of a society and, after them, all those who, thanks to
them, are able to "see" what they "saw." We grant that there are many
difficulties in this view but, in spite of them, it seems to us that this stand-
point is irrefutable.
EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 2, at 341. This view allows for the recog-
nition of personal accomplishment and accounts beautifully for the careers of such
people as Moses, the prophets, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, the suffragettes, and many
individual judges of common law and constitutional courts.
24. PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 8, at 203.
25. Id. at 199.
26. Id. at 206:
The demands of justice become a ruling humanity when a positive rule of
[Vol. 24:705712
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than act out a commitment to the legal order. Hatred and injustice do
reign at times and people refuse to see that which the "ethical genius" has
revealed. For the sake of the security of the community, therefore, the
legal order imposes itself upon all the members of the state-it cannot pre-
tend to acquire a total subjective assent.27  The coerciveness of the law
allows some individuals to live at "a relatively human level, a level which
they would not reach if they themselves had to be just."'28  While there
is a normative relationship between justice and legality, there is a distinc-
tion between what it means to be just and what it means to obey the posi-
tive law. The latter is not always a manifestation of the former. Those
who allow themselves to merely exist within a "quasi-process" of merely
obeying the law through fear of punitive measures have not grasped the
significance of why, and how, they ought to live in community. At the
opposite pole are those who realize the present demands of justice and
who augment the minimum requirements of the law by the practice of
love.2
9
The task of today's legal profession must be, in part, the understanding
of the legal system as an historical phenomenon composed of many inven-
tions and discoveries, each, however, serving for only a time in the totality
of the human pursuit after justice. To attempt to formulate an everlasting
code of law is not only a step toward the impossible, but also a step toward
foolishness and, perhaps, injustice itself . 0
law, imposed with coercive force and thus embodied in the existing relation-
ships, is formulated as that which imposes itself as a demand of humanity
encountered in man's 'yes' to his fellow-man with its actually existing con-
ditions and relations.
27. Id. at 219-20:
When ...humanity is imposed in and through a legal order and begins
to rule a society, it cannot be conceived as a subjective ethical sentiment.
Such a sentiment can never be imposed from without, for by its very nature
it is constituted in and through acts of the subject-as-freedom. The human-
ity that begins to rule in and through a legal order consists in nothing other
than this: certain external actions are done or omitted, even without the
sentiment that animated the 'ethical genius'.
28. Id. at 223.
29. See id. at 229-30. See also _XSTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 2, at
341.
30. See PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 8, at 229:
As soon as an 'invention' is made in the realm of the demands imposed by
intersubjectivity, the legal order becomes antiquated, at least in a certain
sense. That order then embodies only a phase of humanity's history which
has already been passed in the life of the best of a society. If the legal
order would not be changed then, this very order would become an obstacle
for the authentic life of co-existing men.
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II. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: A SPECIAL CASE OF THE
"OUGHT" OF COEXISTENCE
A survey of the literature of civil disobedience demonstrates the need
to isolate this problem and not confuse it with other related issues. There-
fore, before proceeding to the philosophical defense of civil disobedience,
it is necessary to define the scope of this problem in both an exclusive
and an inclusive manner.
A. What Civil Disobedience Is Not
1. Conscientious Objection
Conscientious objection (CO) can be distinguished from civil disobedi-
ence by one defining factor, the element of legality. Conscientious objec-
tion is clearly used within the positive law to signify an exemption from
,the ordinary requirements of a legal duty for those who have demonstrated
a priori that the law is repugnant to their moral, religious or even philo-
sophical values.a' Because of its recognized status under the law, consci-
entious objection is not civil disobedience; however, one who does not, or
cannot, acquire government recognition of a claim for CO classification
might be committing civil disobedience if legal obligations are still refused.
2. Civil Riot
Within the recent past rioting has sometimes been the result of the lack
of concern on the part of government to focus upon the needs and aspira-
tions of people to become a voice in the decisions controlling their des-
tinies. Seemingly some persons have neither the capacity nor the time to
act and wait while the channels of governmental bureaucracy decide upon
a course of action which may or may not alleviate the injustices faced in
day-to-day existence. s2 Like civil disobedience, rioting is violation of the
31. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, as amended, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 456(j) (1970). See also the governing regulations of the Selective Service System
concerning alternate service for conscientious objectors, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.11,
1622.14, 1622.16, 1660 (1974).
Professor Carl Cohen describes conscientious objection as follows:
This device usually takes the form of a clause in certain legislation that
makes it possible for those who find the acts that law requires morally in-
tolerable to comply with the law in some alternative (and to them morally
unobjectionable) way.
C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TAcTiCs, AND THE LAw 42 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as COHEN].
32. See id. at 48-49:
The riot is one way-violent, destructive, and irrational, but for many con-
crete and satisfying-of reacting against a set of social injustices for which
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law, but unlike civil disobedience and conscientious objection, riot does not
follow from motives of considered moral obligation. It is a passionate
response to existing circumstances by those who would ignore the legal
order and its obligations in frustration and frenzied opportunity. The in-
tent of rioting is destructive, and while the act is often understandable,
it is never justified.
3. Revolution
The goals of the revolutionary are much broader than the limited objec-
tives of the civil disobedient. "Revolution seeks the overthrow of consti-
tuted governmental authority, or at least repudiates that authority in some
sphere; civil disobedience does neither. ' 33 Furthermore, the means of
the revolutionary are not restricted: any method at hand is permitted if
the cause is furthered, including the employment of arms and the use of
terrorism. 34 And while the "civil disobedient acts deliberately within the
framework of established political authority; the revolutionary seeks to
demolish that framework, or to capture it."' s 5
we seem to have no foreseeable effective remedy and no rational problem-
solving system that promises remedy.
33. Id. at 42.
34. See id. at 44:
Civil disobedience is another matter entirely. It does not result in death
or misery and rarely entails significant loss of property. It does not seek
to unseat an existing government and does not destroy the order or stability
of national or community life.
35. Id. at 45. It is easy to mistake a revolutionary course of action for civil dis-
obedience; Cohen sees such confusion with respect to the proper labeling of Thoreau
or Gandhi. Concerning Thoreau he writes:
His conduct-deliberate violation of the law and submission to arrest with-
out resistance-is typical of civil disobedience. His essay makes it very
clear, however, that what he intended was not merely protest but the com-
plete repudiation of governmental authority. He wished the government to
"treat him as a neighbor," to recognize him as a "higher and independent
power." . . . Thoreau's act may have been a noble one, but in placing
himself above the law and denying its jurisdiction over him, he became a
rebel [better still, an anarchist]. Although his essay probably introduced
the expression into common speech, Thoreau himself did not, in the strict
sense defend civil disobedience.
Id. at 45-46. Of Gandhi Cohen says:
It is therefore quite misleading to treat Gandhi as a civil disobedient ex-
clusively. To do so is to err on both sides, missing first the fundamental
nature of his aims and achievements, and supposing that civil disobedience
typically seeks the overthrow of established authority.
Id. at 47. Rather than seeking the overthrow or the repudiation of existing state
power and law, the civil disobedient seeks to better the government and to build it
up. The person who has most clearly stood for this position in our time is the late
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B. What Civil Disobedience Is
Civil disobedience can be defined as "an act of protest, deliberately un-
lawful, conscientiously and publicly performed."8 6 This short description is
consistent with the more detailed definition found in the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences:
'Civil disobedience' will here refer to any act or process of public defiance
of the law or policy enforced by established governmental authorities, inso-
far as the action is premeditated, understood by the actor(s) to be illegal
or of contested legality, carried out and persisted in for limited public ends
and by way of carefully chosen and limited means. 37
It can also be said that civil disobedience, for most of its practitioners,
will be in principle a non-violent act. 38
C. A Philosophical Justification of Civil Disobedience
Because civil disobedience is law violation it would be impossible to
justify it within a framework of legal positivism; its moral sanction can
only follow 'from a position of natural law theory. Traditionally the pro-
ponents of the natural law have defended and justifed the practice of civil
disobedience as a response to a positive rule of law which conflicts with
the duties demanded by justice. The following will be an attempt to re-
formulate these defenses within the confines of the phenomenology of jus-
tice which was presented earlier; that is, a view of civil disobedience as
a special case of the demands required by the fact of human coexistence.
Viewing the legal order as the sine qua non of an authentic human
society it seems contradictory to assault that view by seeking to defend
the idea of civil disobedience. This contradiction is overcome by taking
another look at the meaning and function of the legal order as an historical
and ever changing phenomenon. As indicated above, the demands of jus-
Martin Luther King, Jr. See, e.g., Dr. King's Letter from Birmingham Jail, in M.
KINa, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 82 (Signet ed. 1964).
36. COHEN, supra note 31, at 39.
37. Bay, Civil Disobedience, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 473 (1968) (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 474:
For a variety of historical and psychological reasons, it appears that
many believers in civil disobedience see themsleves as wholly committed to
non-violent means, even in self defense or in the defense of others against
murderous assault.
See also John Rawls' definition of civil disobedience:
I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, consci-
entious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bring-
ing about a change in the law or policies of the government.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 364 (1971).
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tice are only minimal when compared to the unlimited opportunities of
love; nevertheless, these demands are themselves constantly expanding.
In the face of these growing obligations, discernible at first only by the
best of a society ("ethical genius"), the process of embodying their dictates
through change in the positive law itself is not only slow, but often resisted
by many.
Once established, it is clearly the case that any legal proposition tends
to begin living a life all its own,39 and the efforts of those who see the
need for new propositions in particular circumstances are either ignored
or fought by the powers that be. While both the system and its officials
ought to be working within a climate of continuous renewal, the legal order
instead becomes torpid and oppressive. Those who hold back progress in
the legal sphere not only prevent a societal life of justice, but are the con-
ditioning agents for a climate ripe for civil disobedient activity.
The problem of civil disobedience is transformed into a duty of crea-
tivity for those who comprehend a state of stagnation within the positive
legal order. One becomes faced with the moral choice between authentic
and inauthentic existence. 40 Fundamentally, to live an authentic existence
is to be true to one's nature as a human person, but the inauthentic life
which characterizes much of human endeavor is a life of the anonymous
and collective "they. '41 The concept of authenticity aids in the descrip-
tion of the type of law violation which stems from the vision and moral
consciousness of an "ethical genius," that is, from one who sees and re-
sponds to a duty presently demanded by justice.
The act of civil disobedience, therefore, is the act of authenticity seek-
ing to re-establish the justice of the legal system by calling to the moral
attention of the society the injustice of the object of protest. Ordinary
and usually inauthentic life will never be the subject of an act of civil dis-
obedience, for the response of inauthenticity before the law is either strict
obedience to the letter of the law or, as in the case of common criminals,
1total contempt and disregard. The inauthentic person does not recognize
in the law the profound insights of those authentic moments which have
given birth to the legal order; for them obedience follows only because
39. See EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 2, at 349.
40. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 2, at 149-68. While the concepts of "authenticity"
and "inauthenticity" have special ontological significance for Heidegger, as do all of
the concepts found in Being and Time, the illumination of them, while not concerned
with anthropology or psychology per se, shed light upon the ontic concerns as well,
i.e., the concerns of the person involved in day-to-day living.
41. Id. at 167: "The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distin-
guish from the authentic Self-that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of
in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]."
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"they" obey and because "they" determine their obedience with the threat
of punishment. On the other hand, the authentic person is one who ex-
hibits a profound individualism which recognizes the truth of justice in co-
existence, and the individual whose sense of moral obligation takes priority
over any duty of obedience to positive law.
It cannot be said that the authentic person will always, or even often,
find it necessary to resort to conscientious law violation as a means of
establishing justice. Civil disobedience should come only after all avail-
able legal channels have been considered, for the civil disobedient, as
"ethical genius," is the same type of individual for whom the establishment
of the legal order itself is an act of moral discovery. Even when chosen,
civil diobedience is not always apparently justified in its own time, but
when a true act of "ethical genius" has occurred its justification precedes it.
Finally, the act of civil disobedience is not merely a personal moral obliga-
tion carried forth, it also appeals to the sense of justice of the society as
a whole, seeking a political base from which to instruct those who control
the legal order. For this reason, the question of civil disobedience as a
legal problem must now be addressed.
III. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: LEGAL TOLERATION?
However evident the moral justification might appear, the question of
justifying this practice within the legal order itself presents further moral
dilemma. Various positions and approaches to the problem are offered
in this section. The first approach represents what is probably a
majority view among the legal profession; the middle two represent a prac-
tical and constitutional approach respectively; the last approach is an his-
torical and societal position which could serve for all cases and is consistent
with the aims of justice and law demonstrated above.
A. Civil Disobedience is Not a Legal Question
While it is doubtful that a crime of civil disobedience will ever be codi-
fied as such within the positive criminal law, it is ridiculous to say that
the legal sciences have not given a good deal of attention to the issue, usu-
ally against its being a truly legal problem. A good example of the atti-
tude of the legal community was summed up in these words:
While one may have empathy for the views which prompt an illegal act,
the action, by definition, must bring forth the arm of the law. On this
basis, it can be argued, quite simply, that civil disobedience is not a legal
problem.42
42. Groll, Clash of Forces, in THE LAW OF DISSENT AND RIOTS 109, 111 (M.
Bassiouni ed. 1971).
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Those who subscribe to this position hold that because the legal order must
call to its defense the absolute integrity of the corpus juris, no intentional
violation of the law may be tolerated. Not only should the system refuse
to acknowledge a defense of civil disobedience, it must also refuse to allow
the notion that there is an offense which can be characterized as civil dis-
obedience and, therefore, treated differently from others. The argument
is that civil disobedience is obsolete where government provides for orderly
and legal methods of change and protest. Here "[t]he underlying as-
sumption is that it is possible to focus society's attention (including, obvi-
ously, the attention of elected officials) upon a [sic] issue through lawful
means."'43 Given the history of the United States, this is the only assump-
tion which is justified, they say. If it appears that this assumption is fail-
ing in any particular circumstance, the response is, "If the issue is thus
presented and no action results, it is more probably than less probable that
the majority of society desires no action (i.e., they are unsympathetic to
the cause)."'44 At this juncture, they say, the protest should be dropped.
It has been said that the practice of civil disobedience violates the very
bases upon which the people are united as a nation. It has even been sug-
gested that civil disobedience poses a greater threat to the state -than the
injuries which an admittedly unjust law makes possible. 45  With these
ideas in mind, former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas concluded, after
careful consideration, that there can be no defense before the law for those
who would choose to commit civil disobedience: "The motive of civil dis-
obedience, whatever its type, does not confer immunity for law viola-
tion."46
While most lawyers would not support a general theory which justifies
civil disobedience within the law, many would support the moral justifica-
tions of this practice offered by philosophers or theologians, preferring to
leave the entire problem to be solved outside the law. However, the prob-
lem cannot be solved apart from the practical and historical input of
people faced with criminal trial and defense responsibilities for the com-
mission of civil disobedience. For the law to ignore this problem is to
betray, not only those conscientious men and women who must be de-
43. id. at 115.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, in THE LAW OF Dis-
SENT AND RIOTS 121, 141 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1971): "Accordingly, it is better that
even unjust laws be obeyed than violated, for the havoc resulting from disobedience
produces evils more profound than any arising from compliance."
46. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND Cm DISOBEDIENCE 32 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as FoRTAs]. See also United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970), wherein Judge Sobeloff writing for the
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fended, but also, the idea of justice itself. Even Justice Fortas recognized
that the lawyer must at least be willing to have a moral position on the
question for he or she is the one most directly confronted with the message
raised in the commission of conscientious law violation. Moreover, on the
legal side, the question presents an awesome constitutional paradox in the
balancing of freedom with responsibilities. 47
B. A Question of Discretion
Some people believe that the law should deal with the question of civil
disobedience through the mechanisms of police and prosecutorial discre-
tion.48 Undoubtedly the decision to forego full criminal process is recog-
nized as desirable in some cases, but for reasons which go beyond the
scope of the civil disobedience problem. For example, discretion may be
invoked as a means of conserving time in the administration of justice or
as a means of preventing the psychological and sociological effects which
arrest or trial may have upon those who might be better served through
alternative disposition such as treatment, counsel or guidance.49 On the
other hand, the use of official discretion has not gone without criticism,
even apart from the question of its use in cases of civil disobedience. 50
Adding to the charged criminal conduct the elements of civil disobedi-
ence, there is even more reason to view the use of discretion not to prose-
court says, "[I]t is commonly conceded that the exercise of a moral judgment based
upon individual standards does not carry with it legal justification or immunity from
punishment for breach of the law." 417 F.2d at 1008.
47. See FORTAS, supra note 46, at 17:
mhe Constitution seeks to accomodate two conflicting values, each of
which is fundamental: the need for freedom to speak freely, to protest ef-
fectively, to organize and to demonstrate; and the necessity of maintaining
order so that other people's rights, and the peace and security of the state,
will not be impaired.
Cf. Sweigert, Moral Preemption: Part III: Claims of "Right" Under the Positive
Law, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 453 (1966).
48. See Hall, Legal Toleration of Civil Disobedience, 81 ETmCs 128, 132-35
(1971) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
49. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 5 (1967): ",It is not in the
interest of the community to treat all offenders as hardened criminals; nor does the
law require that the courts do so."
50. Id. at4:
The main dangers in the present system of nontrial dispositions lie in the
fact that it is so informal and invisible that it gives rise to fears that it does
not operate fairly or that it does not accurately identify those who should
be prosecuted and what disposition should be made in their cases. Often
important decisions are made without adequate information, without sound
policy guidance or rules, and without basic procedural protections for the
defendant, such as counsel or judicial consideration of the issues.
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cute with doubts. The likelihood of either police or prosecutors making
use of their grace is greatly diminished when the criminal conduct is public
and pursued concurrently and long afterward by news coverage. Aside
from issues of extreme urgency and immediate favorable public support,
the community pressures will require a full panoply of criminal process. 51
Recent reaction to the use of executive clemency demonstrates the degree
to which the population is unwilling to bypass the normal judicial adminis-
tration of justice in well known cases.
Furthermore, the usual reasons for the use of discretion are absent from
civil disobedience cases. More importantly, the conscientious law violator
would probably resist any attempt to settle short of the judicial arena, for,
in the final analysis, the civil disobedient intends the message of protest
to reach the government as well as the community. This can best be ac-
complished through confrontation with the government in a court of law.
Any useful employment of official discretion in these cases will probably
come after trial in the form of sentence mitigation. While such judicial
mercy alleviates the suffering of the person convicted, and to this degree
it instructs the -public regarding the beliefs and attitudes of the sentencing
judge, it does not affect the central point in any meaningful way: it does
not adjudicate the correctness of the act nor the justice of the law or policy
which is the target of protest.
Moreover, vigilant prosecution of all law violators, even those who claim
to be civil disobedients, is one way of changing the law. Nothing might
be more effective in removing unpopular laws than the strict enforcement
of those laws, resulting in their removal in the most radical way, through
legislative repeal. Such action is by far more welcome than the wishful
reliance upon the discretion of officials whose job it is to arrest and to
prosecute.
C. A Constitutional Question: Conflicts and Uncertainty
1. Direct Constitutional Challenge
Within the past century numerous defendants have sought to challenge
the validity of their prosecutions under penal laws considered by them to
51. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 48, at 134-35:
American society is extremely legal-minded at present; enforcement of the
law simply because it is the law is highly valued as the only means to law
and order. While one can hope that the use of discretion by public officials
may be more respected in the future than it is at present, and that officials
may therefore be encouraged to act upon their own judgment when faced
with cases of civil disobedience, this seems unlikely in such a law-centered
society. To leave the problem of response to civil disobedience entirely to
1975]
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be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. 52  Because the
criminal justice system often requires that one break a law in order to gain
the standing required to challenge the validity of that law, many men and
women find themselves criminals in the name of the Constitution. Al-
though the definition of civil disobedience was narrowly drawn in the pre-
ceding pages, it is not so narrow that it must exclude constitutional chal-
lenges, or higher positive law challenges, to seemingly unjust law.53
Law itself, therefore, provides a mechanism by which criminal violation
can be ultimately sanctioned. Many have succeeded in having their con-
victions overturned and the laws under which they were prosecuted
declared either invalid per se or invalid as applied. 54 With these cases
in mind, it is possible to say that, to a certain extent, "non-violent revolu-
tion is within the positive law."55
Civil disobedience has sometimes been vindicated as "symbolic speech"
within the protection of the first amendment;56 however,
the First Amendment can hardly be given an interpretation broad enough to
cover most acts of civil disobedience. An act cannot be classified as sym-
the goodwill of government officials would amount to counting upon the
least likely element of society to produce a solution.
52. This discussion, of course, also holds true for those cases which challenge the
constitutionality of a law or policy under provisions of state constitutions.
53. Not all would agree, however, that court confrontation upon constitutional
grounds is a proper response for one claiming the status of a civil disobedient. Some
have suggested that the true civil disobedient ought to merely submit passively to the
government without resort to moral or psychological force in the public forum. See,
e.g., the discussion of this position as it arose among the pacifistic Catholic Worker
Movement in the 1950's and 1960's under the leadership of Dorothy Day in J. & R.
BANNAN, LAw MoRALTrrY AND VIETNAM: THE PEACE MILITANTS AND THE CoURTs 6-9
(1974) [hereinafter cited as BANNAN].
54. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (reversed conviction
for draft resistance by constitutionally expanding class of those eligible for conscien-
tious objector status); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversed conviction
for obstruction of public passage by civil rights demonstrators); Peterson v. Green-
ville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (reversed convictions of 10 black lunch counter sitters-
decided under the equal protection clause); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957) (reversed conviction for contempt of Congress for refusing to answer ques-
tions regarding others' associations with Communist Party); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937) (reversed conviction for holding meeting under auspices of Commu-
nist Party in violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Act of Oregon).
55. Freeman, Moral Preemption Part 1: The Case for the Disobedient, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 425, 431 (1966).
56. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker the Court struck down a school board prohibition of
the wearing of armbands in protest against the Vietnam War; the conduct was consid-
ered as "symbolic speech" anl within the protectiQn of the first And foprteenthgmendmet= . .. .
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bolic speech merely because the agent says that it is an attempt to communi-
cate some message.57
Thus, while one might envision ,the Constitution as encompassing in part
the values of the natural law,58 the bounds of constitutional review and
nullification, unlike the bounds of love which know no law, cannot be said
to encompass every, or even most cases of civil disobedience. Even under
the broad penumbra of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, constitu-
tional challenge is only a possibility, and it is clearly not the solution to
the problem at hand.
2. Uncertainty Provided by the Political Question Doctrine
Recent challenges to the defense policies of the United States concern-
ing the prosecution of the war in Southeast Asia were raised within the
context of criminal trials for the mutilation of government records, 59 inter-
ference with the operations of the Selective Service System,60 and other
related offenses."' While these cases also presented first and fourteenth
amendment claims, they often concentrated on the question of the legality
of the Vietnam War under existing principles of international law to which
the United States had assented.62 Asserting the supremacy of these prin-
ciples over the military policies being pursued by the President with the
passive "consent" of Congress,63 the defendants soon found that the courts
were unwilling to address the issues of international law and instead would
rely upon the judicially created "political question" doctrine. 64
57. HALL, supra note 48, at 132. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968), which unsuccessfully presented the claim that the destruction of one's
draft card in protest against the Vietnam War and in violation of Section 12(b)(3)
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604, as amended, 50
U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(3) (1970), was "speech" within the meaning of the first
amendment.
58. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in one opinion of the Supreme Court, "The victory
for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain
of conscience there is a moral power higher than the State." Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970) and § 2071(a) (1970).
60. See 50U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
61. For examples of cases presenting these types of prosecutions see note 63 infra.
62. See, e.g., London Agreement, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945), E.A.S.
No. 472; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S.
No. 993; Kellogg-Briand Pact, August 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343 (1928), T.S. No. 796.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 294 F. Supp. 515, 294
F. Supp. 520 (D. Mass. 1968); Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C.
1966), aII'd, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom., Mora v. McNa-
mara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
64. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
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The argument has been made that an affirmative defense, analogous
to a mistake of law defense,6 5 be available for those who, in good faith, vio-
late the law for the purposes of testing its constitutionality or in reliance
on a reasonable belief that the law is unconstitutional.66 Referring to
those cases which challenged the national policy with respect to the war
in Vietnam, Professor Graham Hughes asks, "Is a decision that a matter
involves a political question equivalent to a decision that the challenged
actions of the executive are legal?" 67 Distinguishing de facto power from
the ultimate question of constitutionality, Hughes agrees with the late
Alexander Bickel that the issue is left in abeyance and thereby creates
confusion and uncertainty throughout the law profession. 68 This being the
case, one might be justified in relying upon the principled legal opinion
that does exist, or which can be inferred therefrom in good faith. 9
This political question defense, however, does not address itself to all,
or even a significant number, of the possible cases of conscientious law
violation. The minimal requirements 70 which Hughes outlines indicate
that the issue would arise as an affirmative defense, after a preliminary
showing, and would be dealt with by the jury as an issue of fact. All this
(1946); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849).
65. See, e.g., Illinois' ignorance or mistake of law defense provision, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 4-8 (1973).
66. Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hughes].
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id. at 17:
It seems to me that some of those who oppose the actions of the executive
with respect to the military operations in Vietnam believe that the courts
have somehow abdicated their decision-making functions and so have left
open the question of the legality of the acts of the executive to private de-
termination by each citizen in his own legal conscience.
69. Cf., e.g., Douglas, The Rule of Law in World Affairs, in A WoRLD Wrriotrr
WAR 145 (Washington Square Press ed. 1961); see also Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent
in Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 (1967), arguing that certiorari should not
be denied.
70. Hughes outlined the following minimal requirements to plead the "political
question" defense:
1. That the defendant had the purpose, not of disobeying the law, but of
demonstrating its unconstitutional character.
2. That there was legitimate doubt about the constitutionality of the law
as perhaps evidenced by expert testimony about the state of professional
opinion.
3. That there was no way short of disobedience by which the defendant
could have obtained a determination of the validity of the law.
4. That the disobedience was non-violent.
Hughes, supra note 66, at 5.
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would only arise, however, upon a final determination rejecting the de-
fendant's constitutional position or a final abstention from deciding it
again. The prospects for administering such a scheme seem to be rather
poor, and in the final analysis, one would be left in no better position than
reliance upon judicial mercy at sentencing time. Under this procedure,
if successful, an individual defendant might be excused, but only once; the
act itself, however, is never justified at law.
D. A Question for the Jury: The Power of Nullification
The history of the Anglo-American jury is at once both mystifying and
obvious-mystify-ing in its numerological problems, yet obvious in its role
as a buffer between an accused and the government.7 1 A complete his-
torical analysis of the criminal jury is beyond the scope of this Comment,
yet even a cursory reading of the literature on juries will reveal that the
role of the jury in the trial of a criminal case involving civil disobedience
can assume an extraordinary importance, but an importance which the
courts would prefer not to be discovered. 72
At least from the Middle Ages the right of the English jury under the
common law to return general verdicts in criminal cases has been an un-
doubted prerogative. While this prerogative once meant that the jury was
to be the judge of both facts and law, an idea which is now all but for-
gotten, it is still the accepted meaning of trial by jury in criminal cases.73
71. See the historical discussion concerning the role of the criminal jury in Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968); see also the descriptive defense of
the criminal jury offered by Wigmore nearly a half-century ago:
The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjust the general rule of law to
the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law
is avoided, and popular satisfaction is preserved.
Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y 166,
170 (1929).
72. See, e.g., Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L
L. 71 (1969). This article reviews the history of jury powers and demonstrates the
legality of nullification in both English and American precedents. See also I. ALEX-
ANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIvE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENOER (2d
Katz. ed. 1972), for the detailed account of a colonial case wherein the jury was
moved to assert its power of nullification through the instrumentality of defense
counsel, Andrew Hamilton. But see G. WORTHINGTON, Am INQUIRY INTO THE POWER
OF JURIES TO DECIDE INCIDENTALLY ON QUESTIONS OF LAW (13 The Law Library,
New Series, Wharton ed. 1840), which argues that the jury has not the right to de-
cide questions of law and supports a strict application of the maxim ad questionem
lacti non respondent judices, ad questionem legis non respondent juratores (judges
should not decide questions of fact, jurors should not decide questions of law)
[author's translation]. Nevertheless, even Worthington recognized that the general
verdict could legally cover up findings of law adverse to the instructions of the court.
73. The legal history of England reveals that the jury was originally a body in-
vested with the right and power to judge both the law and the facts of the cases be-
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Because the general verdict encompasses the jurors' findings of fact and
application of facts to law in the single pronouncement of guilt or inno-
cence and because the court may not question the basis which a jury has
for an acquittal, the power of deciding law, as well as facts, remains for
fore them. As early as the thirteenth century this right had been codified, but not
without some means of preventing abuse:
And also It is Ordained, That Justices assigned to take Assises shall not
compel the Jurors to say precisely whether it be Disseisin or not, so that
they do shew the Truth of the Deed, and require Aid of the Justices; but
if they of their own head will say that it is [or is not] Disseisin, their
Verdict shall be admitted at their own Peril.
Statute of Westminster 2d, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30 (1285). The peril spoken of refers to
not only the threat of hell for one's perjured verdict, but also the attaint upon the
verdict which was accomplished by a plea to a second, and larger jury. If a verdict
was attainted, civil and criminal penalties could befall the jurors. Thus, through these
threats the courts sought to insure that juries would defer to the wisdom of the judges
as to the law of each case. See also Act, 11 Hen. 7, c. 24 (1494).
Several trials for seditious libel resulted in conflicting positions as to the rights and
powers of the English jury. See, e.g., Case of the Seven Bishops, 3 Mod. 212, 87
Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1688) (this case is cited in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 124 (1895)); Rex v. Shipley (Dean of St. Asaph), 4 Dougl. 73, 99
Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1784). However, in 1792 Parliament passed the famous "Fox
Libel Act" which restored to the jury its function to decide the whole issue of a crim-
inal case:
[Oin every such Trial, the Jury sworn to try the Issue may give a General
Verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty upon the whole Matter put in Issue upon
such Indictment or Information; and shall not be required or directed by the
Court or Judge before whom such Indictment or Information shall be tried,
to find the Defendant or Defendants Guilty, merely on the Proof of the
Publication by such Defendant or Defendants of the Paper charged to be a
Libel, and of the Sense ascribed to the same in such Indictment or Informa-
tion.
32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792).
The leading United States case on the authority of juries to decide the law as well
as facts is Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). Significant state cases
include the Vermont decision in State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849), and three Illinois
cases which interpreted the statutory grant of power to juries to decide law and facts
in criminal cases: Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1 (1887); Mullinix v. People, 76 Ill. 211
(1875); Fisher v. People, 23 IM. 218 (1859). The Illinois provision granting this
power was Criminal Code, REV. CODE OF LAws OF ILL., § 176 (1827). Both the
Vermont courts and the Illinois courts later reversed these decisions, holding jury
power to decide law to be either contrary to the common law or unconstitutional.
State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1 (1892); People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931).
Section 176 of the Illinois Criminal Code was ultimately repealed by the General As-
sembly and replaced with a provision dividing the law and fact decisions between the
court and the jury respectively. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4 (1973). The author-
ity of Brailsford was undermined by the case Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156
U.S. 51 (1895), which held that the Constitution did not require that juries be al-
lowed to decide the law as well as the facts.
Today Maryland seems to be the only jurisdiction which explicitly adheres to the
ancient formula for jury trial in criminal cases. The constitution of this state pro-
vides that "the Jury shall be the judges of Law, as well as of fact.... ."MD. CONST.
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the jury to grasp at any time. However, the problem of letting the jurors
know of their latent authority of nullification seems almost insurmountable
in the face of a court's instructions to the contrary.
While the courts, in theory, recognize the legitimacy of the jury's power
to nullify the law applicable to any set of facts and evidence, they are
unwilling to admit such power in the presence of jurors or allow counsel
to argue this issue to jurors. 'In the case United States v. Moylan,74 for
example, which involved the prosecution of the "Catonsville Nine" 75 for
the destruction of government property, mutilation of government records,
and interference with the Selective Service System, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions by
denying to them the right to have the jury hear an instruction on their
power of nullification; however, the opinion of the court admitted that the
jury had such power.76  Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has
recently held that while the power of nullification exists in the criminal
jury's inherent right to return an unquestioned verdict of not guilty, the
court has no obligation to instruct the jurors as to this power; moreover, it
art. XV, § 5; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 593 (1971), which implements the
constitutional provision. In contrast to the Vermont and Illinois decisions which
held such schemes unconstitutional, the Maryland procedure has been upheld against
constitutional attack. Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359 (1961), appeal dis-
missed, 372 U.S. 767 (1963); Boswell v. State, 5 Md. App. 571, 249 A.2d 490
(1968). But cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), wherein the Court says,
"Maryland's constitutional provision making the jury in criminal cases 'the Judges of
Law' does not mean precisely what it seems to say." Id. at 89. See also Dennis,
Maryland's Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 34 (1943).
74. 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
75. I.e., Mary Moylan, Daniel and Philip Berrigan, Thomas and Marjorie Mel-
ville, Thomas Lewis, George J. Misehe, John Hogan, and James Darst, nine Roman
Catholic war resisters.
76. See 417 F.2d at 1006:
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit,
even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary
to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to
the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds
of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that
the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent cir-
cumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which ap-
peals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the
courts must abide by that decision.
But compare this position with that of a judge who wished to remain anonymous:
"I do not -think a juror has the right to vote his conscience, so to speak, in reference
to his attitude toward the law. And when he is sworn in as a juror he affirms, or
makes such oath at the time, to follow the instructions of the judge." BANNAN, supra
note 53, at 199.
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appears that the court should do all in its power to instruct to the con-
trary. 77
The attitude of the bench, therefore, with few exceptions, 78 is to con-
tinue to allow the possibility of nullification as long as the right to jury
trial remains a meaningful part of constitutional liberty. Nevertheless, the
possibility is to be minimized by refusing to allow its concept into the court
room dialogue. While !the feeling of those who would allow open court
discussion of nullification is that it would be better for jurors to exercise
this power within the framework of proper instruction rather than from
improper prejudice or television influence, 79 one does not expect much
change of mind within any foreseeable future on the part of judges. In-
deed, the very future of trial by jury seems questionable at this point in
history.80
While other methods of coping with the problem of civil disobedience
within the legal order are either inappropriate or too narrow in scope, the
vehicle of jury nullification seems to be designed for this very problem.
Nullification recognizes that the civil disobedient must be dealt with not
77. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this
case the court's opinion said, inter alia, "This so-called right of jury nullification is
put forward in the name of liberty and democracy, but its explicit avowal risks the
ultimate logic of anarchy." id. at 1133. Furthermore, the court attempts to justify
the hiding of this power from the jury by stating,
it is not inappropriate to add that a juror called upon for an involuntary
public service is entitled to the protection .... that he can fairly put it to
friends and neighbors that he was merely following the instructions of the
court.
Id. at 1136.
78. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon in the Dougherty
case:
Nullification is not a "defense" recognized by law, but rather a mechanism
that permits a jury, as community conscience, to disregard the strict require-
ments of the law where it finds that those requirements cannot justly 'be ap-
plied in a particular case.
417 F.2d at 1140. Judge Bazelon favors allowing this mechanism to operate either
through the court's instruction to the jury regarding its powers or through counsel's
appeal to the jury to exercise its powers.
Consider also the instructions which were given 'by Judge George Phillips of the
Superior Court of Alameda County (California) in the trial of the "Oakland Seven
Conspiracy" in 1969. BANNAN, supra note 53, at 117-23. Judge Phillips' instructions
develop an insight concerning the relationship between motive and criminal intent
which allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendants' moral commitments
in arriving at their verdicts. (The seven were acquitted.)
79. See, e.g., Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters,
57 YALE REV. 481 (1968). See also the report of Professor Freund's position, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1968, at 4, col. 4.
80. See cases cited in note 1 supra.
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only as one who challenges the legal system to a certain degree, but
also as one who hopes that the law is broad enough to encompass the de-
mands which justice presents within a particular context.81 Rather than
weakening the state with the risk of anarchy, nullification allows the rule
of law to expand when it appears evident that the obligation of coexistence
transcends its present expression in the positive legal order. Nullification
is a means of incorporating the real and present demands of justice into
the administration of the law; and, therefore, the assumption by a jury
of the power to nullify the law in a case of conscientious law violation sug-
gests that society, as represented by the jury, has come to see that the in-
sights of the civil disobedient require some reflection in the actual rule of
law which the state has established.
CONCLUSION
Shortly after the end of World War H Karl Jaspers gave a series of lec-
tures concerning the role of the average German citizen in the responsi-
bility for the Holocaust.8 2 The question of duty to one's country and duty
to obey the law was found to be at the root of any response to his general
inquiry concerning the question of guilt. During one of the lectures Jaspers
confessed,
* . . our duty to the fatherland goes far beneath blind obedience to its rulers
of the day. The fatherland ceases to be a fatherland when its soul is de-
stroyed. The power of the state is not an end in itself; rather, it is per-
nicious if this state destroys the German character. Therefore, duty to the
fatherland did not by any means lead consistently to obedience to Hitler
and to the assumption that even as a Hitler state Germany must, of course,
win the war at all costs. Herein lies the false conscience. It is no simple
guilt. It is at the same time a tragic confusion, notably of a large part of
our unwitting youth. To do one's duty to the fatherland means to commit
one's whole person to the highest demands made on us by the best of our
ancestors, not by the idols of a false tradition.8 3
Although the recent experience which -the United States has encoun-
tered throughout the Vietnam-Watergate era reveals a situation in which
morality, and justice as expressed in the rule of law, are abandoned in
favor of power and security, a national spirit surfaced among the
American people which prevented things from going completely according
to the plans which emanated from Washington. Accordingly, while a gov-
81. Dean Roscoe Pound wrote some years ago: "Jury lawlessness is the great cor-
rective of law in its actual administration." Pound, Law in Books and Law in Ac-
tion, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910).
82. K. JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (Ashton transl. 1961).
83. Id. at 65.
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ernment might seek to flounder in a sea of decadence, a nation need not
surrender to the whims of those with power. Unlike Germany in the
1930's and 1940's, America in the 1960's and 1970's demonstrates that
blind obedience need not be the only path along which patriotic men and
women walk. True to the "demands made on us by the best of our an-
cestors," the American people, if not their government, will surely preserve
the soul and character of their country long beyond our Bicentennial Era.
Part of that soul and that character has been expressed in the acts of those
who would commit civil disobedience in order to preserve the justice of
law; this being the case, civil disobedience will become an even greater
problem the day its possibility ceases to exist.
Ronald Patrick Stake
